Time and Memory in Freud and Heidegger: An Unlikely Congruence

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Introduction

Bringing Freud and Heidegger together around the theme of time and memory seems an unpromising project. Freud gave no indication of being aware of Heidegger, Heidegger conveyed a certain contempt for Freud for scientizing the human being, and the respective ideas of these intellectual giants suggest little in common. What then can we expect from a confrontation of the two. In what follows I will try to demonstrate a congruence that is not immediately apparent. I will begin with a description of Heidegger’s analysis of time and memory, then examine Freud’s treatment of time in an attempt to uncover an experience of temporality that demonstrates a surprising congruence with Heidegger’s analysis. In a final section I will suggest ways in which the two thinkers might offer complementary readings of one another.

Heidegger on Time and Memory

Most of you will be familiar with Heidegger’s analysis of temporality, elaborated most fully in *Being and Time*¹ and the posthumous *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*². Heidegger begins his analysis with a careful description of our ordinary experience of time. He then tracks this experience in two opposite directions: on the one hand into the vulgar, “leveled down” experience of time as a succession of now-points, on the other hand into a full phenomenological treatment of human temporality. Let me briefly describe his account of the everyday experience of time and the two trajectories into which it leads.

In describing the structure of everyday time experience, Heidegger notes a number of features. As he summarizes, “[everyday time] is datable, spanned, and public and, as having this
structure, it belongs to the world itself.” The datable character of everyday time refers to our manner of framing our experience in terms such as “then,” “now,” “before,” today,” “yesterday,” and so forth. Such dating is more fundamental that the calendar and clock and precedes them. The second character of everyday time is its being spanned or stretched along. The ‘now’ stretches back into ‘a moment ago’, and forward into a ‘then’ or a ‘later’. The third feature of everyday time, its publicness, is related to the fact that man or Dasein is always a “being with (Sein-mit).” We are always out in the world with others. Our experience of time thus always includes the experience of others. “...several people can say ‘now’ together, and each can date the “now” in a different way.” Finally, because Dasein is Being-in-the World, time as public is also world time. To repeat Heidegger’s summary statement: everyday time “is datable, spanned, and public and, as having this structure, it belongs to the world itself.”

I indicated above that this everyday experience of time leads in two directions: vulgar time and primordial temporality. The first is a leveling down (Nivellierung) that occurs when everyday time becomes objectified through the use of clocks and other precise measuring devices. In clock time one moment is like another and follows its predecessor with ruthless regularity. Time becomes a succession of now-points, a linear series of ‘nows’ or ‘presents’ that extends indefinitely into the past in one direction and into the future in the other. Heidegger writes that “...time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly ‘objectively present’ nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the ‘flux’ of nows, as the ‘course of time’.” He insists that such now-time is a leveling down of the everyday experience of time as stretched along: “In the everyday “living along” that takes care, Da-sein never understands itself as running along in a continuously enduring succession of pure “nows.” By reason of this covering over, the time that Da-sein allows itself has gaps in it, so to
Now if everyday time is capable of being leveled down to the vulgar notion of clock time or now-time, it may also provide an opening into a full phenomenological disclosure of human temporality. For Heidegger, time markers like ‘then’ and ‘now’ and ‘tomorrow’, and the quality of a stretching along of time, provide hints of a human temporal experience of a quite different order from the linear succession of now-points. I do not simply have a past as a series of receding now-points, I exist now in the present as having been. In similar manner, my future is not merely a series of now-points that will occur at some future time; rather, I exist now as projected into my future possibilities. And the present is not just “a now ‘in which’ something comes into being, passes away, or is objectively present”\(^8\); it is rather the Moment that temporizes itself out of its past and into its future. Taking advantage of the etymological meaning of ecstasy as standing out, Heidegger describes the three temporal modes of past, present, and future as the three ecstases of human temporality: here now in my present, I stand out into my past and into my future.

Thus far in this section I have focused on Heidegger’s analysis of human temporality. What about memory? Heidegger does not write at length about memory, but his view can be extracted from his analysis of historicity. With the latter word Heidegger elaborates on the temporal quality of human existence. He writes: “The analysis of the historicity of Da-sein attempted to show that this being is not ‘temporal’ because it ‘is in history’, but because, on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being”\(^9\). Or again: “…the interpretation of the historicity of Da-sein turns out to be basically just a more concrete development of temporality”\(^10\). In the context of historicity, man as a historical being, memory is not the neutral recall of past events but rather the retrieval (Wiederholung) of possibilities that remain part of oneself; that, in Heidegger’s words, have been handed down.
“Resoluteness that comes back to itself and hands itself down then becomes the retrieve of a possibility of existence that has been handed down. Retrieve is explicit handing down, that is, going back to the possibilities of the Da-sein that has been there”\(^{11}\). When Heidegger speaks here of the retrieve of possibilities, he is suggesting that I remember what is meaningful to me in my ongoing life, and meaningful in the sense that I carry with me those issues, projects, possibilities from my past and that they determine my present and my future. Finally, the retrieval that constitutes remembering is intimately associated with forgetting. I remember against a background of forgetting; I retrieve from a matrix of the forgotten. “...remembering is possible only on the basis of forgetting, and not the other way around. In the mode of forgottenness, having-been primarily ‘discloses’ the horizon in which Da-sein, lost in the ‘superficiality’ of what is taken care of, can remember”\(^{12}\). If we substitute ‘repressing’ for ‘forgetting’ in this citation, we are well on our way to Freud, whom I will now take up.

**Freud on Time and Memory**

When we consider Freud’s view of time and temporality, the first thing that may come to mind is his notion of *timelessness*, the timelessness of the unconscious. This idea is with Freud from the beginning. In a letter to Fliess in 1897 he refers to the “neglect of the characteristic of time” that is “no doubt essential for the distinction between activity in the preconscious and unconscious”\(^{13}\). A few years later in *The Interpretation of Dreams* he informs us that “it is a prominent feature of the unconscious processes that they are indestructible. In the unconscious nothing can be brought to an end, nothing is past or forgotten”\(^{14}\). In his paper on “The Unconscious” in 1915 Freud contrasts the mental activity of the unconscious versus the preconscious/conscious as primary process versus secondary process and attributes to unconscious, primary process mentation the quality of timelessness. “The processes of the system Ucs. are
timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs.”\(^\text{15}\). Now we should note, in the context of this presentation, that the time Freud is referring to, and that is negated by the unconscious, is a Heideggerian notion; it is what Heidegger refers to as clock time or now-time, that simple succession of nows that provides the basic temporal order in our lives. A few paragraphs later in “The Unconscious” Freud writes that “it devolves upon the system Pcs. to make communication possible between the different ideational contents so that they can influence one another, to give them an order in time...”\(^\text{16}\). It is the task, then, of conscious/preconscious, secondary process thought to provide basic, temporal order.

If this first glance at Freud’s treatment of time suggests a two-layered arrangement—neat, orderly progression on the conscious level, complete negation of order on the unconscious level, a second look provides a more nuanced and complicated picture—one that I will approach through three aspects of Freud’s thought—sexual development, Nachträglichkeit, and the repetition compulsion. I will try to show that this unpacking of Freudian temporality begins to show a congruence with Heidegger’s analysis.

At the first level, in his treatment of sexual development Freud describes a development that is indeed progressive, but also marked by fits and starts, accelerations and fixations, times of quiescent movement and other of emotional turbulence. The time of sexual development is in a sense still linear, but not the leveled-down linear time of the clock and calendar. The key text is The Three Essays on Sexuality of 1905, in which Freud offers his first, fully elaborated account of sexual development. After reminding the reader that as far back as 1896 he has “insisted on the significance of the years of childhood in the origin of certain important phenomena connected with sexual life”\(^\text{17}\), he undertakes his account of the uneven development of human sexuality. As he
summarizes:

There seems no doubt that germs of sexual impulses are already present in the new-born child and that these continue to develop for a time, but are then overtaken by a progressive process of suppression; this in turn is itself interrupted by periodical advances in sexual development or may be held up by individual peculiarities. Nothing is known for certain concerning the regularity and periodicity of this oscillating course of development. It seems, however, that the sexual life of children usually emerges in a form accessible to observation round about the third or fourth year of life.\textsuperscript{18}

We are familiar with the Freudian stages. Sexual life begins in the pregenital stage in which autoerotic, component instincts remain unintegrated as they progress through the oral and anal-sadistic phases. The developing child reaches a partial integration in the phallic, oedipal stage, and this is followed by the interruption of the latency stage, when counter mental forces such as feelings of disgust, shame, and “the claims of moral ideals” “impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like dams, restrict its flow”\textsuperscript{19}. The child reaches a final stage with puberty, when component instincts are integrated into the beginnings of adult sexuality.

This, in bare outline, is Freud’s account of sexual development. Freud notes that in the best case sexual development is marked by an “oscillating course,” and he is quick to add that, with human beings, there is never a best case. Problems with sexual development are common and are at the origin of adult character and neurosis. Sexual development is thus the arena of psychological conflict–and the arena in which the defensive operations like fixation, repression, and sublimation play out. These conflicts with their attendant defenses deeply complicate the straightforward course of development and suggest a complexity of human temporality that I will exploit to put Freud into dialogue with Heidegger.
I will now focus on two manifestations of the play of drive and defense in psychic conflict and how such conflict disrupts the linear flow of human time. The first manifestation is Freud’s notion of Nachträglichkeit, translated as ‘deferred action’ in English and ‘après-coup’ in French. If the time of sexual development, as just described, remains loosely linear, that is no longer the case with Nachträglichkeit. The concept refers to a traumatic event that is only experienced emotionally at a later date when the individual is mature enough to appreciate its significance. Laplanche and Pontalis describe it as a “Term frequently used by Freud in connection with his view of psychical temporality and causality: experiences, impressions and memory-traces may be revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development. They may in that event be endowed not only with a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness”20. These authors quickly add a statement that bears directly on our theme: “The first thing the introduction of the notion does is to rule out the summary interpretation which reduces the psycho-analytic view of the subject’s history to a linear determinism envisaging nothing but the action of the past upon the present”21.

Freud’s most famous example of Nachträglichkeit is the Wolf Man, who experiences a primal scene of his parents at one and a half and doesn’t undergo the traumatic effect until the age of four, when, more mature and under the sway of the castration complex, he is able to grasp the meaning of the original event. In a footnote Freud adds that this case involves still another level of deferred action or Nachträglichkeit.

...the patent under analysis, at an age of over twenty-five years, was putting the impressions and impulses of his fourth year into words, which he would never have found at that time. If we fail to notice this, it may easily seem comic and incredible that a child of four should be capable of such technical judgements and learned notions. This
is simply another instance of *deferred action*. At the age of one and a half the child receives an impression to which he is unable to react adequately; he is only able to understand it and to be moved by it when the impression is revived in him at the age of four; and only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp with his conscious mental processes what was then going on in him. The patient justifiably disregards the three periods of time, and puts his present ego into the situation which is so long past. And in this we follow him, since with correct self-observation and interpretation the effect must be the same as though the distance between the second and third periods of time could be neglected.\(^\text{22}\)

To summarize this account of Freudian temporality thus far, sexual development suggests a loosely linear time that is marked by turbulence and oscillation, and *Nachträglichkeit* dramatically shakes up the linearity of that development. The final Freudian notion I will address, the repetition compulsion (*Wiederholungszwang*), suggests still further disruption of linear time. Freud had long recognized the tendency of both patients and non-neurotic individuals to repeat unpleasant experiences; indeed, such a tendency is at the very core of neurotic behavior, as patients repeat and recreate behaviors and situations that to all appearances bring them nothing but further suffering. Freud takes up this theme at length for the first time in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. In that work he begins with a list of behaviors in which the self-defeating repetition stands out: traumatic war neuroses in which the victim relives the traumatic event in dreams, the tendency of children (as exemplified by Freud’s grandchild in the famous ‘fort-da’ anecdote) to reenact painful experiences in play, and neurotic behaviors and especially transference neuroses in which patients reenact their central, conflict-driven and painful old relationships with their analysts. After describing the latter Freud concludes:
If we take into account observations such as these, based upon behaviour in the transference and upon the life-histories of men and women, we shall find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle. Now too we shall be inclined to relate to this compulsion the dreams which occur in traumatic neuroses and the impulse which leads children to play.23

What Freud does with the phenomenon of repetition is to some (this reader included) truly odd. He uses the repetition compulsion as the basis for his new notion of the death instinct (I should say doubly odd, since the death instinct in the end serves the pleasure principle and thus the repetition compulsion is in fact not beyond the pleasure principle). In his wish to launch his new idea Freud passes over a more obvious and commonsense understanding of the repetition compulsion. In discussing the child’s recreation of painful experiences in play, he recognizes an effort to turn a passive situation into an active one and thereby to master the painful experience. He hints of such a dynamic in the transference neurosis but does not develop what seems like an obvious explanation of this phenomenon: namely, the patient’s recreation of old, unmastered conflicts in an effort to master them. In each of the situations described by Freud, one can imagine the individual saying, I will keep doing this until I get it right.

The point of this exposition is not, however, to correct Freud’s theory of the repetition compulsion and the death instinct. It is rather to focus on the repetition compulsion as a further way in which psychoanalytic experience ruptures anything like a simple, linear flow of human development—and thereby leads us into the dialogue with Heidegger.

**Freud and Heidegger**

Granting that the analysis of time and memory is explicit in Heidegger and implicit in
Freud, let me summarize briefly what I find in common between the respective analyses. For both there is a human temporality more basic than linear clock time, and for both memory is not simple retention but rather a process dictated by current interests. How then can we compare them, engage them in dialogue, and read each in terms of the other?

To initiate this dialogue I must first dispose of a distracting point. It is essential to note that for both Heidegger and Freud, the core analysis of time and memory has survived the particular content that each has given to his analysis. Heidegger revealed the structure of time and memory around existential, Kierkegaardian themes of resolution, being-toward-death, and memory as the retrieval of that specific possibility. Most contemporary readers are arguably less interested in those Heideggerian themes, and are comfortable ignoring them while holding onto his analysis of time and memory. In similar manner, few contemporary psychoanalysts hold to Freud’s original drive theory, but continue to think in terms of the convolutions of time and memory implicit in Freud’s thought. In engaging the dialogue between the two thinks, then, I will ignore an apparent conflict between drive theory and being-toward-death and focus on what I consider more basic differences.

First, what does psychoanalytic time and memory look like when read in Heideggerian terms? As we have noted, human development does not progress in a simple linear fashion. It is marked by developmental stages, but not stages occurring in a simple progression, one merely following the other; rather, each stage is, in Heideggerian terms, a present that is still living its past and projecting out of that past the possibilities of its future. \( \text{Nachträglichkeit} \) points to the activity of the past in the present. It is a dramatic instance of a present that exists as having been. This notion readily lends itself to a Heideggerian analysis, but with a Freudian twist. \( \text{Nachträglichkeit} \) is not memory as conscious retrieval from the past as forgotten possibility but rather memory as
turbulent eruption of emotion-laden content from the past as repressed unconscious. We have also noted that for Freud development is marked by conflicts, and the recurrence of conflicts. Freud kept these centered tightly on psychosexual development, but his successors have not had difficulty broadening the notion of psychological development beyond the narrow bounds of Freudian sexual development. What is relevant in this Heideggerian reading of developmental conflict and the repetition compulsion is that our core conflicts follow us through our lives and involve us in ever-circling and recircling efforts to work them over again and again, always seen in a new perspective at the life stage one is at, always reworking the past and reawakening slumbering memories of unthought of possibilities, always projecting one into new variations of one’s future. The Heideggerian spin on conflict and repetition reminds us how naive it is to think of a such a conflict as a problem that is simply resolved through psychotherapeutic intervention and is not heard from again. It is more realistic to think of the conflict as something that is worked over again and again as one moves through life. In Heideggerian terms, conflict and repetition dramatize the interplay of the ecstases of past, present, and future. The time of repetition is less a linear flow than a spiral in which the moving present is constantly sweeping backward and forward at the same time.

Now, finally, how can we imagine a Freudian reading of Heidegger? Since my sympathies are with Heidegger’s philosophical anthropology and opposed to Freud’s efforts to reduce the human being to a biological organism, I will dismiss any attempt to read Heidegger through Freud’s positivist lens. That demurrer does not, however, end the conversation, since there is still much for Freud to offer in this imagined conversation. A Freudian reading of Heidegger on time and memory is very much the obverse of the reading just proposed. What we find in Freud, in contrast to Heidegger, is human time and memory as shaped by the turmoil of emotion and
psychological conflict. Opposing Freud to Heidegger in this manner might meet with the rejoinder that fo Heidegger has his own account of emotion with his notion of mood or attunement (*Befindlichkeit*). Mood, or *Befindlichkeit*, is after all as equally disclosive of Dasein as is understanding. But as sensitive as Heidegger is to the mood dimension of Dasein’s self-disclosure, *Befindlichkeit* does not begin to match the turmoil of Freudian conflict. The central Freudian notions of *Nachträglichkeit* and repetition point to primitive desire that is thwarted, rejected, repressed, distorted, turned into its opposite—that is, subjected to the full array of the Freudian defenses. In this struggle between desire and defense, as desire surfaces, sinks back, and resurfaces from the unconscious, as it gets worked over and changes, human time spirals backward and forward in an inextricable fashion. These Freudian notions create a real chaos of Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality. *Nachträglichkeit* is not a simple experience of Dasein’s having been; it is an emotional upheaval in which an unsettled trauma erupts into unwelcome awareness. Freudian repetition, *Wiederholung*, is not merely Dasein’s retrieve of a slumbering possibility for being; it is a recurring and relentless reliving of the old and unresolved conflict.

Let me conclude with this notion of *Wiederholung*, which we translate in English as repetition and retrieve. It is a central concept for both our authors and thus serves to encapsulate their commonality and difference. For both it represents a temporality in which the past is fully alive in the present, as well as a sense of memory in which what is retrieved is what connects with the living present. But it also bespeaks their difference, and the way in which each might complement the other. For Heidegger *Wiederholung*, retrieve, is the harkening back to one’s most authentic possibilities; for Freud it is the driven, compulsive repetition of unresolved conflict. For Freud, Heidegger’s *Wiederholung* is a reminder that breaking out of the endless cycle of the repetition compulsion requires drawing on untried potentialities from the past; for Heidegger,
Freud’s *Wiederholung* is a reminder that unresolved conflict may be an insurmountable barrier to authentic retrieve.
References


5. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 381. [Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, “...sie ist datierbar, gespannt, öffentlich und gehört als so strukturierte zur Welt selbst” (414).]


entsteht, vergeht oder vorhanden ist” (338).]


ideal anforderungen)" (Vol 5, 85].)


nach 25 Jahren Eindrücke und Regungen aus seinem vierten Jahr Worte verleiht, die er
damals nicht gefunden hätte. Vernachlässigt man diese Bemerkung, so kann man es leicht
komisch und unglaubwürdig finden, dass ein vierjähriges Kind solcher fachlicher Urteile
und gelehrter Gedanken fähig sein sollte. Es ist dies einfach ein zweiter Fall von
Nachträglichkeit. Das Kind emfängt mit 1 1/2 Jahren einen Eindruck, auf den es nicht
genügend reagieren kann, versteht ihn erst, wird von ihm ergriffen bei der Wiederbelebung
des Eindrucks mit vier Jahren, and kann erst zwei Dezennien später in der Analyse mit
bewusster Denktätigkeit erfassen, was damals in ihm vorgegangen. Der Analysierte setzt
sich dann mit Recht über die drei Zeitphasen hinweg und setzt sein gegenwärtiges Ich in
die längstvergangene Situation ein. Wir folgen ihm darin, denn bei korrekter
Selbstbeobachtung und Deutung muss der Effekt so ausfallen, als ob man die Distanz
zwischen der zweiten und der dritten Zeitphase vernachlässig könnte" (Vol. 8, 164].]

Beobachtungen aus dem Verhalten in der Übertragung und aus dem Schicksal der
Menschen werden wir den Mut zur Annahme finden, dass es im Seelenleben wirklich
einen Wiederholungszwang gibt, der sich über das Lustprinzip hinaussetzt. Wir werden
auch jetzt geneigt sein, die Träume der Unfallsneurotiker und den Antrieb zum Spiel des
Kindes auf diesen Zwang zu beziehen” (Vol. 3, 232).]